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What about using sub resource integrity to allow users to request a specific JS version using its integrity attribute in the URL, that way shares also use the same pinned version, and can check/verify the integrity themselves or via some centrally informative place as well.


The problem here is that there's no good way in the browser Javascript runtime to verify the current execution environment. All you can check are the script assets you load, not whether your current running code has been eval'd into something malicious.

This is a very old debate that we're recapitulating here; if you sense that I'm being less than forthcoming about it, it's because there's something like 11 years of history of it in the search box below the page.

I don't much care about the argument here. I'm have two things to say in this thread:

1. "Wormhole" is a bad name for a new secure file transfer system, since one of the better-known cryptographic file transfer systems is already named "Magic Wormhole" and has the command "Wormhole". It's confusing, and especially annoying since there's no dispute that Magic Wormhole is more secure than this application --- even if you think, incorrectly, that browser Javascript crypto is "end-to-end", there's no coherent way to suggest that it's as secure as the native Magic Wormhole program.

2. AES-GCM is not in fact a perfectly cromulent AEAD; it is an imperfectly cromulent AEAD, and one most designers would probably do well to avoid (use XSalsa-Poly1305, with random nonces).


X


I really don't understand this "if I disagree with an argument, it's fulmination" point you keep trying to make. Further: I haven't called you names at any point in this discussion --- that's a line you're starting to cross. I think perhaps we should just disengage. I'm not asking you to respond to me. If you feel we're not getting anywhere, we don't have to keep talking.


D


I don't think you're doing a very good job of advocating for this person; if you were arguing this way with someone else on my behalf, I'd ask you to stop.


Fair, adios. Would appreciate if you actually respond to subresource integrity question. Why isn’t that valid? One could couple this with a CSP that restricts eval and Function or what ever is necessary. This all seems to be just about browsers in general.


It is in fact about browsers in general. They're a very hostile environment for cryptography.




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